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1. Context and Motivation 
Safety-critical systems commonly face unpredictable and hostile environments, with 
emergent behaviors and with a growing number of external, malicious attackers. These are 
risk factors that should be taken into account during these systems design phases, but that is 
not always possible due to the overall complexity of the interaction between the systems and 
its external operational environment. Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are notable examples of 
practical implementations of safety-critical systems. Being able to guarantee that safety-
critical CPS do not fail upon operation can easily become a huge challenge, depending on how 
complex the system is. Among the most promising approaches to reduce the complexity of 
designing safety-critical CPS are Runtime Monitoring (RM) (Watterson and Heffernan 2017) 
and Runtime Verification (RV) (Bartocci Et al. 2018), where monitors are generated and 
orchestrated in a software architecture that can be coupled to the target system, observe it 
during its execution, and identify aspects that were not foreseen during design phase, or that 
could not be proved to be absent via static verification methods. Monitors can be used to 
verify the correct functioning of a system by analyzing direct (and/or indirect) aspects of it. 
This can be especially useful when considering a security-oriented point of view, where 
monitors can identify possible security attacks to a system when exposed to the events taking 
place or the patterns of data being processed. 
2. Related Work 
However, when making use of monitors, one has to ensure that the use of such technique 
does not 1) influence negatively in the security aspects of the original system by, for example, 
leaking information that should be kept private (Krieg Et al. 2012); 2) affect the functional and 
non-functional requirements of the system, for instance, tasks scheduling requirements (Khan 
Et al. 2016). As for the state-of-the-art in the integration of security and functional aspects of 
monitoring generation, the design of monitoring architectures and the implementation of 
security aspects are performed separately, where no formal verification of such integration is 
performed. This can lead to problems of design and implementation, possibly affecting 
aspects of security, safety, dependability, and performance of the monitored system. 
3. Project Proposal 
As an attempt to approach such problems, we intend to investigate novel approaches that 
enable the verification of CPS via the coupling of the system with runtime monitoring 
architectures in such a way that security and safety aspects are considered already in the 
design/implementation phase, and that the associated monitors do not interfere with the 
original specifications and behavior of the target monitored system. For that, we follow along 
the lines of designing a new Domain Specific Language (DSL) that allows to express what 
monitoring functional and non-functional properties should be verified during runtime, as well 
as security and privacy requirements for the communication between the components being 
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monitored and the monitors, generating in this manner the code that implements the 
underlying runtime verification architecture and the code for the monitors and their coupling 
with the architecture. 
 
The envisioned DSL will also consider in the core of its design, the generation of verification 
conditions that will ensure the satisfaction of the functionality of the monitors, the respect of 
their interactions with the system in terms of security and privacy properties, and the 
consistency of the underlying runtime monitoring architecture. These verification conditions 
will be submitted to external automatic formal verification tools like model checkers, SMT 
solvers, and security focused formal verification tools tool for verifying security related 
properties) to guarantee their correctness-by-construction. This exempts the system 
designer/developer from the necessity of worrying about the security aspects of what needs 
to be monitored in the system, being the compiler of the proposed DSL the entity responsible 
for ensuring the generation of a secure monitoring architecture. 
 
Regarding more concrete details about how we envision the design of the DSL and associated 
tool support, our proposal is to focus on using/extending existing formal coordination 
languages (e.g., the Reo language), to specify runtime monitoring architectures for distributed 
CPS with privacy and real-time requirements. To the best of our knowledge this has never 
been address in any prior research effort. Aspects that are expected to be explored include 
the extension of the current set of Reo’s connectors to the case of distributed systems, and 
also to enrich them with privacy related properties and explicit timing constraints to cover the 
verification of fundamental aspects related to real-time embedded computing. Once this is 
achieved, the objective is to select/extend a suitable formal semantics that is able to express 
the behaviors one can specify using the envisioned DSL and generate the verification 
conditions already mentioned.  
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